on May 28, 2015 at 2:00 pm
«Computational social choice»: The theory of social choice aims at the construction and analysis of methods for collective decision; it is an important branch of mathematical economics. Typical examples of collective decision-making include elections of political representatives; secular votes (for example, a group of friends deciding on a restaurant); equitable sharing of resources (for example, distribution of property between former spouses in a divorce judgment, distribution of classes and time slots in a high school); seeking consensus on a verdict at a jury meeting. So far, social choice theorists have given little attention to algorithmic issues. This is where computing (and more specifically artificial intelligence and operational research) comes into play. Over the past ten years, a field of research has been developing, at the intersection of social choice and computer science, called «computational social choice». Two directions of research can be distinguished. The first aims to import concepts and procedures from social choice theory to solve problems from computer applications, including aggregation procedures for the classification of web pages. The second (and most important) aims to use computer concepts and methods to solve or rethink complex collective decision problems. The presentation will review some of the key issues of computational social choice, including the exact or approximate calculation of complex voting rules, voting on combinatorial domains, computational barriers to strategic behaviors, design of interaction protocols for collective decision-making, and equitable sharing of resources.
Location: IRCICA Auditorium, Haute Borne Science Park in Villeneuve d’Ascq
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English